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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Javier Garcia, Jr., appeals from the district court's Judgment of 
Conviction. Mr. Garcia asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine and that the 
district court erred in denying the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. As such, he 
asserts that this Court must vacate his conviction. 
Assuming arguendo that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, 
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the court 
reporter to reread a portion of the confidential informant's testimony. While rereading 
this testimony, the court reporter was allowed to reread hearsay statements that the jury 
had been told to disregard after sustained objections, and other sections, containing 
clarifications of earlier testimony and highly important information, were not reread. The 
rereading of this limited portion of the testimony prejudiced Mr. Garcia. Additionally, the 
district court failed to recognize that it had discretion to allow or disallow the reading of 
the testimony or a duty to ensure that its discretion was exercised to ensure that no 
party was prejudiced. This error requires the vacation of Mr. Garcia's conviction and a 
remand for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 3, 2011, Mr. Garcia was charged with one count of aiding and abetting 
the delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 7 -9.) Mr. Garcia pled not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.88-97, 117-124.) 
1 
The State's first witness was Corporal Michael Abaid, an officer with the Sun 
Valley Police Department. (Tr., p.i32, L. 7 - p.i33, LA.) Corporal Abaid worked on the 
Narcotics Enforcement Team and testified regarding general information about 
confidential informants and the purchase/sale of illegal substances. (Tr., p.i33, L.16 -
p.i39, L.23.) Corporal Abaid then discussed working with the confidential informant 
used in the case at hand and his observations and actions on August 25, 2010, the date 
that Mr. Garcia was alleged to have aided and abetted the delivery of 
methamphetamine to confidential informant Martinez. (Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.169, L.7.) 
The State's next witness was Sergeant Kim Orchard, another officer with the Sun 
Valley Police Department involved with the Narcotics Enforcement Team. (Tr., p.202, 
L.3 - p.203, L.10.) Sergeant Orchard prepared the confidential informant for the 
purchase, assisted in surveillance, and picked up the confidential informant following 
the alleged purchase. (Tr., p.207, L.17 - p.219, L.i8.) 
The State then presented the testimony of the confidential informant, Ignacio 
Martinez. Mr. Martinez testified that he was working as a confidential informant for the 
local police to have a felony charge reduced to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p.227, L.22 -
p.229, L.19.) Mr. Martinez set up a meeting with Ricardo Vargas to purchase 
methamphetamine on August 25, 2010. (Tr., p.230, Ls.17-24.) When Mr. Martinez 
arrived at the buy location, Mr. Vargas and Jose Hurtado were both present. (Tr., 
p.236, L.7 - p.237, L.22.) Mr. Martinez was not immediately provided with the 
methamphetamine; instead, Jose Hurtado made a phone call to an unidentified person 
and told Mr. Martinez that the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour. (Tr., 
p.238, Ls.14-25.) After the phone call, the three waited a while, Robert Garcia showed 
up in a white Mercedes SUV, and chatted for a bit. (Tr., p.239, L.2 - p.240, LA.) After 
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Mr. Garcia left, Jose Hurtado told Mr. Martinez that it would be about another half hour 
before the methamphetamine arrived. (Tr., p.240, Ls.5-8.) 
After waiting a while longer, Robert Garcia showed up again and, after that, 
Mr. Martinez received some methamphetamine from Jose Hurtado. (Tr., p.241, Ls.16-
19.) Mr. Martinez clarified that it was about an hour between Mr. Garcia's visits and that 
it was about fifteen to twenty minutes after Mr. Garcia left that the buy concluded. (Tr., 
p.252, Ls.9-16.) During those fifteen to twenty minutes, Mr. Martinez remained with 
Ricardo Vargas and Jose Hurtado and he let Mr. Vargas take a couple of rocks from the 
methamphetamine baggie. (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-24.) 
The State's last two witnesses testified regarding the chain of custody of the 
methamphetamine and the laboratory confirmation of the illegal substance. (See 
generally testimony of Curtis Miller Tr., p.299, L.11 - p.328, L.6 and testimony of 
Heather Campbell Tr., p.329, L.1 - p.343, L.24.) 
Defense counsel moved for a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, noting 
that the State had failed to prove to meet their burden of proof. (Tr., p.348, Ls.1-6.) 
The district court decided to reserve ruling, noting that it was going to "wait and see 
what the jury does." (Tr., p.372, Ls.19-24.) 
After the case was given to the jury, the district court received a request that the 
court reported reread the testimony of the confidential informant. (Tr., p.242, Ls.7-9.) 
The district court explained to the jury that it would have the direct reread to them in its 
entirety and then give them the opportunity to ask for a reading of further testimony if 
they wanted to hear it. (Tr., p.428, Ls.3-13.) During this rereading, the portions of the 
testimony that included hearsay objections that were sustained and instructions for the 
jury to disregard the specific testimony were reread to the jury. (Tr., p.442, L.20 -
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p.443, L.5, p.447, LsA-15.) Although the entire requested direct examination was not 
reread as requested, the jury informed the district court that they had heard what they 
needed to and no additional testimony was reread to the jury. (Tr., pA51, Ls.3-14.) 
The jury found Mr. Garcia guilty. (R., p.125.) 
Following the return of the jury verdict, defense counsel renewed the motion for 
judgmental of acquittal. (Tr., pA62, Ls.17-18.) Counsel noted that, "now there is 
evidence that the jury may have considered sustained objections, evidence from things 
that they were supposed to disregard, and so I would like for the record to have the 
Court reconsider the motion at this time." (Tr., pA62, Ls.21-25.) The district court 
denied the motion. (Tr., p.463, Ls.1-18.) 
Mr. Garcia was sentenced to a unified sentence of four years and eight months, 
with two years and two months fixed. (R., pp.147-150.) Mr. Garcia filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.152-155.) The district court 
granted Mr. Garcia an appellate bond, entering an Order for Stay of Execution of 
Sentence Pending Appeal. (R., p.162.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Garcia's conviction for aiding and abetting the 
delivery of methamphetamine because there was insufficient evidence to support 
the conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the rereading of a 




This Court Should Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction For Aiding And Abetting The Delivery 
Of Methamphetamine Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The 
Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Garcia asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
the jury's guilty verdict. The State failed to present any direct evidence of Mr. Garcia's 
involvement with the drug purchase or tying him in any way to the methamphetamine 
delivered on the date of the confidential informant's purchase and the circumstantial 
evidence proved only that Mr. Garcia stopped by briefly twice during the extended drug 
purchase. Additionally, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient 
to convict him of the charged crime. Therefore, the district court's denial of the motion 
for judgment of acquittal should be reversed and this Court should vacate Mr. Garcia's 
conviction. 
B. Standard of Review 
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995). 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in 
scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 2008). The appellate court applies 
the same standard when reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827,828 (Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828. "For evidence to be substantial, it must 
be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State 
v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 
128 Idaho 580,586 (1996)). This Court does not substitute its view of the evidence for 
that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to 
attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, the 
Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. Glass, 
139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict 
Finding Mr. Garcia Guilty Of Aiding And Abetting The Delivery Of 
Methamphetamine 
Mr. Garcia was charged with one count of aiding and abetting the delivery of 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.7-9.) He asserts that the State's evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's verdict and that his conviction must be vacated. 
In this case, the State's evidence was as follows: The State's first witness was 
Corporal Michael Abaid, an officer with the Sun Valley Police Department. (Tr., p.132, 
L. 7 - p.133, LA.) Corporal Abaid worked on the Narcotics Enforcement Team and 
testified regarding general information about confidential informants and the 
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purchase/sale of illegal substances. (Tr., p.133, L.16 - p.139, L.23.) Corporal Abaid 
then discussed working with the confidential informant used in the case at hand and his 
observations and actions on August 25, 2010, the date that Mr. Garcia was alleged to 
have aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine to confidential informant 
Martinez. (Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.169, L.7.) He noted that he was monitoring the wire and 
watching from a safe distance, where he could hear everything, but had limited visual 
surveillance; he was able to see that the confidential informant was there and at times 
see other individuals. (Tr., p.159, L.3 - p.162. L.5.) 
At the meeting place for the methamphetamine exchange, Corporal Abaid 
noticed three core individuals (confidential informant Martinez, Ricardo Vargas, and 
Jose Hurtado-Deatorre) and that other individuals were coming and going. (Tr., p.161, 
Ls.1-16.) About fifteen minutes after Mr. Martinez arrived, a white Mercedes, known to 
be owned by Mr. Garcia, arrived at the location and after a few minutes left. (Tr., p.162, 
L.17 - p.163, L.19.) For about the next forty-five minutes people were milling around 
talking and then the white Mercedes showed up again. (Tr., p.163, L.20 - p.164, L.6.) 
One individual approached the vehicle and then the vehicle left. (Tr., p.164, Ls.12-17.) 
Corporal Abaid could not see how many people were in the vehicle. (Tr., p.164, L.22-
24.) After another five to ten minutes of conversation, the confidential informant left the 
location and was picked up. (Tr., p.165, L.8 - p.166, L.5.) The methamphetamine was 
collected and processed for testing. (Tr., p.166, L.17 - p.177, L.2.) On cross-
examination, Corporal Abaid admitted that he believed they had tested the bag that the 
methamphetamine was provided in and were unable to find any fingerprints. (Tr., 
p.194, Ls.17-22.) 
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The State's next witness was Sergeant Kim Orchard, another officer with the Sun 
Valley Police Department involved with the Narcotics Enforcement Team. (Tr., p.202, 
L.3 - p.203, L.10.) Sergeant Orchard prepared the confidential informant for the 
purchase, assisted in surveillance, and picked up the confidential informant following 
the alleged purchase. (Tr., p.207, L.17 - p.219, L.18.) During the time the confidential 
informant was at the location, Sergeant Orchard was able to see that there were other 
unidentified people at the location and that a white SUV showed up for a short period of 
time and returned later. (Tr., p.212, L.19.) On cross-examination, Sergeant Orchard 
noted that she did not see who was driving the SUV. (Tr., p.222, Ls.9-10.) 
During Sergeant Orchard's testimony, there was an issue with hearsay from the 
confidential informant. (Tr., p.215, L.7 - p.217, L.25.) The jury was told to disregard 
testimony that the confidential informant told the officer that "Robert brought it [the 
methamphetamine]." (Tr., p.216, Ls.13-25.) 
The State's next witness was the confidential informant, Ignacio Martinez. 
Mr. Martinez testified that he was working as a confidential informant for the local police 
in order to have a felony charge reduced to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.229, 
L.19.) Mr. Martinez set up a meeting with Ricardo Vargas to purchase 
methamphetamine on August 25, 2010. (Tr., p.230, Ls.17-24.) When Mr. Martinez 
arrived at the buy location, Mr. Vargas and Jose Hurtado were both present. (Tr., 
p.236, L.7 - p.237, L.22.) Mr. Martinez was not immediately provided with the 
methamphetamine; instead, Jose Hurtado made a phone call to an unidentified person 
and told Mr. Martinez that the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour. (Tr., 
p.238, Ls.14-25.) After the phone call, the three waited a while, Robert Garcia showed 
up in a white Mercedes SUV, and chatted for a bit. (Tr., p.239, L.2 - p.240, LA.) After 
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Mr. Garcia left, Jose Hurtado told Mr. Martinez that it would be about another half hour 
before the methamphetamine arrived. (Tr., p.240, Ls.5-S.) Mr. Martinez did not expect 
to see Mr. Garcia that day, but he did expect him to return after showing up the first 
time. (Tr., p.242, Ls.S-20.) 
Mr. Garcia arrived a second time and parked near where the men were standing. 
(Tr., p.243, Ls.1-5.) Prior to his arrival, Mr. Martinez had already given the buy money 
to Jose Hurtado. (Tr., p.244, Ls.16-21.) Mr. Martinez was not able to remember if 
Mr. Garcia was alone or if Mr. Garcia got out of the SUV or if Jose Hurtado approached 
the vehicle. (Tr., p.243, Ls.9-17.) This time, Mr. Garcia did not talk to Mr. Martinez. 
(Tr., p.244, Ls.5-11.) Mr. Martinez clarified that all he saw was Mr. Hurtado approach 
Mr. Garcia's SUV, noting that he was now sure that Jose approached the SUV, with his 
back turned towards Mr. Martinez and that he was only assuming that is when the 
transaction occurred. (Tr., p.254, L.22 - p.255, L.2.) Mr. Martinez testified that when 
Jose Hurtado approached Mr. Garcia's SUV he did not see anything change hands, 
specifically seeing no money or drugs. (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-20.) Mr. Hurtado and 
Mr. Garcia were close enough to touch each other, but Mr. Martinez did not see what 
their arms were doing. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-10.) 
Mr. Garcia was only at the location for a minute or two and after he left, Jose 
Hurtado handed Mr. Martinez the methamphetamine. (Tr., p.244, Ls.12-15.) It was a 
few minutes after the meeting at the SUV, probably three or four minutes, that Jose 
Hurtado handed the methamphetamine to Mr. Martinez. (Tr., p.255, Ls.11-1S.) 
Mr. Martinez clarified that it was about an hour between Mr. Garcia's visits and 
that it was about fifteen to twenty minutes after Mr. Garcia left that the buy concluded. 
(Tr., p.252, Ls.9-16.) During those fifteen to twenty minutes, Mr. Martinez remained 
10 
with Ricardo Vargas and Jose Hurtado and he let Mr. Vargas take a couple of rocks 
from the methamphetamine baggie. (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-24.) Mr. Martinez then walked 
away and was picked up by the police. (Tr., p.257, Ls.5-22.) Mr. Martinez then told the 
officers in response to the question "Did Robert bring the methT that yes, he had. 1 (Tr., 
p.258, L.1 - p.259, L.1.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Martinez noted that while he was standing outside 
during the drug purchase at least a couple of other men, some of whom he did not 
know, came and went. (Tr., p.267, L.18 - p.268, L.7.) During this same time, Jose 
Hurtado, who was wearing shorts with pockets, left saying he was going to the store 
about an hour after Mr. Martinez arrived; Mr. Martinez had no personal knowledge of 
where Mr. Hurtado went during that time. (Tr., p.268, L.15 - p.269, L.19.) Mr. Martinez 
had not given the buy money to Mr. Hurtado before he left and, to his knowledge, 
Mr. Hurtado did not have anything with him when he returned. (Tr., p.275, L.19 - p.276, 
L.8.) 
Mr. Martinez also reiterated that he handed the buy money to Jose Hurtado, 
while Mr. Garcia was not present, and that it was Jose Hurtado that handed him the 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.270, L.23 - p.271, L.13.) Mr. Martinez again noted that he 
could not see Mr. Hurtado or Mr. Garcia's hands while they were talking at the SUV and 
that he never saw any methamphetamine in Mr. Garcia's SUV. (Tr., p.274, L.19 -
p.275, L.3.) 
Mr. Garcia certainly concedes that the State's evidence proved that he was 
present at the location the methamphetamine sale occurred. However, he maintains 
1 The State attempted to introduce the audio recording made from the wire Mr. Martinez 
was wearing; it was ultimately not admitted. (Tr., p.245, L.16 - p.251, L.9.) 
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that the State failed to prove that he had any involvement with the delivery of 
methamphetamine that occurred that day. There is no direct evidence that Mr. Garcia 
aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine: no witnesses testified that they 
saw Mr. Garcia possessing methamphetamine, hand off methamphetamine, collect 
money for the methamphetamine, or discuss the sale or delivery of the 
methamphetamine; his fingerprints were not on the baggie that contained the 
methamphetamine; he was never connected to the buy money; and no evidence tying 
Mr. Garcia to any methamphetamine involvement was presented. Instead the case was 
based upon circumstantial evidence: that Mr. Garcia showed up at the buy location for 
two short visits; that the last visit was shortly before the methamphetamine was 
provided; and that the confidential informant, although he saw no exchange, assumed 
that Mr. Garcia had brought the methamphetamine. This evidence simply does not rise 
to the level of sufficient evidence. This is especially true in this case, where it is also 
reasonable to assume that Mr. Hurtado could have provided the methamphetamine 
independent of any involvement by Mr. Garcia. Mr. Hurtado collected the buy money 
and delivered the methamphetamine to Mr. Martinez, left the location, going to an 
unknown location, for a short period of time about an hour into the meeting, and would 
have been able to conceal the methamphetamine had he picked it up during this "trip to 
the store." Furthermore, several other unidentified males came and went from the buy 
location, adding to other reasonable explanations about how the methamphetamine 
may have arrived at the buy location. 
Mr. Garcia is not the only one concerned about the sufficiency of the evidence in 
this case. In fact, in a highly irregular sentencing hearing, the district court went out of 
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its way to note its serious concerns about the jury's verdict and to highlight the 
weakness of the State's case: 
Like I say, I rarely, if ever, comment on the evidence, and I believe 
ordinarily it's not necessarily for the Court to do so and probably is 
uncalled for or bad form on the State's - or on the Court's part to comment 
on the evidence in most cases. Sometimes, however, courts at 
sentencing refer to the evidence of guilt as overwhelming and they're 
confident in the verdict. This is not one of those cases that had - that the 
evidence was overwhelming. 
Why I'm making any comment at all is Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's 
as well, that in order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury 
considered other evidence that was either unreliable from a legal 
perspective of that the jury was told to disregard. 
In a very, very close case, which this was, those are the kinds of things 
that tip the case one way or another.2 I am not saying that Mr. Garcia 
didn't do what he's charged with. The jury found him guilty. What I have 
is concerns about is the conviction, is the - some of the things the jury 
might have considered in a very narrow, very close case. In many cases 
this would not matter, this type of thing wouldn't matter at all. In this case 
I'm afraid it might. 
(Tr., p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.) Ultimately, the district court granted an appellate bond 
based upon serious concerns about the verdict: 
The jury was out a while in this case. They did come back and read -
have the court reporter read excerpts of the testimony. It was a very close 
case. The quantum of evidence is - it's anyone's guess to me what the 
appeals court will do with it. So I don't - I think in the ordinary case where 
2 The district court detailed a number of concerns regarding evidence that the jury may 
have improperly considered including testimony from the CI that they were waiting for 
the meth to be delivered; that the evidence was circumstantial and there were 
explanations for Mr. Garcia's presence at the location of the drug deal; that the jury may 
wonder where Mr. Garcia got the money for a Mercedes; that the jury was allowed to 
hear that the car had been involved in drug activity in the past and that officers ask if 
Robert was there which strongly suggested that Robert had been involved in drug 
activity, a fact that was unproven and unsubstantiated by the evidence; and that 
testimony regarding the question "Was Robert there?" was emphasized by the objection 
and subsequent discussion. (Tr., p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.) 
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the evidence is - pretty clearly sustains the verdict, it's appropriate to start 
serving your sentence. 
Where it's questionable - and it's a call, frankly, I'm leaving to the 
Court of Appeals, and it's a - to me, I think it's a close call for the Court of 
Appeals, I'm going to grant the stay. 
(Tr., p.510, Ls.6-17.) The above discussion by the district court highlights its concern 
that the case was very, very close and that the State may have only received a guilty 
verdict, not based upon substantial evidence, but the jury's consideration of evidence it 
was explicitly told to disregard. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see 
also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1996). There was no evidence, much less 
substantial and competent evidence, presented that proved, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Mr. Garcia aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine. Instead, all 
that the State's evidence proves is that Mr. Garcia was an acquaintance of people 
involved in the drug trade and stopped by to visit with these people during the same 
time that Mr. Martinez was purchasing methamphetamine from Mr. Hurtado and 
Mr. Vargas, much like other uncharged individuals. The record does not reflect that 
Mr. Garcia had any involvement in the delivery of methamphetamine and, therefore, 
insufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of 
methamphetamine. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garcia's Motion For Judgment Of 
Acquittal Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for 
judgment of acquittal as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain 
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the jury's guilty verdict for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. The 
district court has authority under I.C.R. 29(a) to dismiss a case if the evidence is 
insufficient to convict the accused. I.C.R. 29(a). The rule provides: 
[t]he court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry 
of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, 
information or complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a 
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered 
by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence. 
I.C.R. 29(a). 
In State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
stated that when reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to 
I.C.R. 29(a), the record is freely reviewed, taking all inferences in favor of the State in 
determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. Id. at 
873 (citations omitted). An appellate court independently considers evidence in the 
record to determine "whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's 
guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt," with all reasonable inferences taken in favor of the State. Id. (citations omitted). 
The reviewing court will not substitute its view "for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). 
Defense counsel moved for a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, noting 
that the State had failed to prove to meet their burden of proof. (Tr., p.348, Ls.1-6.) 
Defense counsel argued that: 
The only evidence that's come in that Robert Garcia could have 
possibly aided and abetted was that he showed up at the scene. After he 
left, Jose Hurtado handed methamphetamine to the CI. No one saw 
Robert Garcia with methamphetamine, no one found it on him, he didn't 
have any money, he didn't have any fingerprints on any of the evidenCe. 
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(Tr., p.349, Ls.8-14.) Ultimately, the district court decided to reserve ruling, noting that it 
was going to "wait and see what the jury does." (Tr., p.372, Ls.1 9-24.) 
Following the return of the jury verdict, defense counsel renewed the motion for 
judgmental of acquittal. (Tr., pA62, Ls.17-18.) Counsel noted that, "now there is 
evidence that the jury may have considered sustained objections, evidence from things 
that they were supposed to disregard, and so I would like for the record to have the 
Court reconsider the motion at this time." (Tr., pA62, Ls.21-25.) 
The district court denied the motion: 
Given the State's burden in this case, the burden of proof required 
of the State, this is a very, very, very close case, and a finding of guilt of 
innocence in a case like this, to me, turns on a razor's edge, and who 
knows what the jury considered. But in view of the jury's finding, the jury 
feels there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence was circumstantial. There's [sic] different 
conclusions a jury could reach based on how they put the evidence 
together. But in view of the jury's finding, I'm not willing to grant a motion 
for judgment of acquittal, so I'll deny the motion. 
(Tr., pA63, Ls.1-18.) 
The district court took the opportunity to further discuss the motion for judgment 
of acquittal at the sentencing hearing: 
The State's case, I would say in this case, was very thin. In view of the 
jury's finding that the case was proven by a reasonable doubt, one could 
point to that result and say, well, there were twelve reasonable people all 
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is why I deferred 
ruling on the motion in order to see what the jury would do. And once the 
jury entered a finding of guilt, I am very reluctant and I have not disturbed 
the jury verdict. 
(Tr., pA96, Ls.17-25.) 
The district court clearly had very serious concerns about the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the case at hand. It was erroneous for the district court to not fully review 
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the evidence and make a determination based upon its independent analysis of the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Instead of conducting a proper analysis, the district court 
skirted the issue and chose to rely only upon the jury's determination. The district 
court's actions violated the very spirit of Criminal Rule 29, as the rule would not provide 
an opportunity to grant a judgment of acquittal after the return of a jury verdict if such 
verdict was to be blindly relied upon, even when the district court has serious concerns 
that the verdict was improper. 
In this case, we know that the district court had concems that the jury had 
considered inadmissible evidence, "Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's as well, that in 
order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury considered other evidence that 
was either unreliable from a legal perspective or that the jury was told to disregard." 
(Tr., p.498, Ls.17-21.) The district court noted that the consideration of improper 
evidence may have tipped a razor thin case in the direction of a guilty verdict. (Tr., 
p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.) 
Mr. Garcia asserts that the evidence presented in the case at hand was not 
sufficient to support a guilty verdict (see section C above) and that it was error for the 
district court to abandon its serious concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence in 
favor of upholding a jury verdict, thereby failing to conduct its own independent analysis, 
and to ultimately deny the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. 
E. This Court Must Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction 
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Garcia 
committed the crime of aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine, this Court 
must vacate his conviction. 
II. 
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The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading Of A Limited 
Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the court 
reporter to reread a portion of the confidential informant's testimony. While rereading 
this testimony, the court reporter was allowed to reread hearsay statements that the jury 
had been told to disregard after sustained objections. Rereading this portion of the 
testimony prejudiced Mr. Garcia. 
Furthermore, by rereading only a limited portion of the confidential informant's 
testimony, the district court allowed for the likelihood that the reread testimony would be 
given undue weight or emphasis by the jury at the exclusion of other highly relevant 
testimony provided by the confidential informant. 
Additionally, the district court failed to recognize that it had discretion to allow or 
disallow the reading of the testimony or a duty to ensure that its discretion was 
exercised to ensure that no party was prejudiced. This abuse of discretion requires the 
vacation of Mr. Garcia's conviction and a remand for a new trial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009). An appellate court reviewing a district court's 
discretionary decision engages in a three part analysis: First, whether the district court 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; second, whether the court acted within 
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and 
third, whether the court reached is decision through an exercise of reason. State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989)(1989). 
Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection 
was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged 
errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Garcia only has the duty to prove that 
an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
On appeal, Mr. Garcia also raises an instance of potentially un-objected to error related 
to the rereading of excluded testimony. If this Court determines that this claim of error 
is raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Garcia must establish that the error is 
reviewable as "fundamental error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court recently revisited 
fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first 
show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
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constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, 
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry 
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading Of A 
Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimonv, Resulting In Undue Prejudice 
To Mr. Garcia 
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds there was sufficient evidence to prove 
Mr. Garcia's guilt, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion in rereading 
only a portion of the confidential informant's testimony and rereading portions of the 
testimony that had been ruled inadmissible and that the jury had been told to disregard 
because they prejudiced Mr. Garcia. 
In Idaho it has been held proper to allow a jury to return to the courtroom from its 
deliberations in order to rehear testimony. State v. Jester, 46 Idaho 561 (1928); State v. 
Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739 (1927); State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. 
Car/son, 134 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 2000). Idaho Code § 19-2204 states: 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement 
between them as to the testimony . . . they must require the officer to 
conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information 
required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have 
been called. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2204, a trial court must attempt to meet any 
reasonable requests by the jury for the rereading of testimony. Couch, 103 Idaho at 
208; Carlson, 134 Idaho at 399. There is no error in reading only the part with which the 
jury expresses concern, United States v. Tyers, 487 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973), nor if jury 
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requests only prosecution testimony, it is necessary to reread other testimony. United 
States v. Hurst, 436 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1971). However, a Court may read all of 
witness's testimony if the court believes that reading of mere portion requested would 
be misleading. United States v. Tager, 481 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973). 
The overwhelming weight of authority in this country is that the 
reading of all or part of the testimony of one or more of the witnesses at 
trial, criminal or civil, at the specific request of the jury during their 
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court. It is, of course, essential 
that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner that there is a 
likelihood of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury. 
Couch, 103 Idaho at 208 (quoting Settle v. People, 180 Colo. 262 (1972». The trial 
court should exercise its discretion to ensure that a party to the litigation is not 
prejudiced. Couch, 103 Idaho at 208; Carlson, 134 Idaho at 399. 
After the case was given to the jury, the district court received a request that the 
court reported reread the testimony of the confidential informant. (Tr., p.242, Ls.7-9.) 
Although the jury originally requested the "CI testimony," the request was clarified that 
they wanted the "State's questions" and direct, not redirect. (Tr., p.242, Ls.7-14.) 
Defense counsel objected noting that, "a lot of the answers of the confidential informant 
changed or were significantly clarified by my cross-examination," in effect arguing that 
rereading the limited portion may be prejudicial. (Tr., p.425, Ls.11-14.) The district 
court stated that it was not going to tel/ the jury what they are going to listen to, that the 
jury gets to select what they want to hear. (Tr., p.425, Ls.15-18.) The district court 
continued: 
But I think it's up to them to tell me what they want to hear, not up 
to me to tell them, no, you need to listen to this, also .... Well, in my view, 
the jury can come in and say we want you to find a specific question and a 
specific answer read to us. And that's what they want. And I think it's the 
Court's obligation under the statute to give them what they want, not what 
I think they want or what we want to give them. So I'm only going to give 
them what they want. 
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(Tr., p.426, Ls.2-4, 19-25.) 
The district court explained to the jury that it would have the direct reread to them 
in its entirety and then give them the opportunity to ask for a reading of further testimony 
if they wanted to hear it. (Tr., p.428, Ls.3-13.) The court reporter then began reading 
the testimony to the jury. (Tr., p.428, Ls.22-23.) However, the rereading stopped 
before the entire direct had been reread. (Tr., p.428, L.25 - p.451 , L.3; compare with 
Tr., p.226, L.13 - p.262, L.11.) During this rereading, the portions of the testimony that 
included hearsay objections that were sustained and instructions for the jury to 
disregard the specific testimony were reread to the jury. (Tr., p.442, L.20 - p.443, L.5, 
p.447, Ls.4-15.) Although the entire requested direct examination was not reread as 
requested, the jury informed the district court that they had heard what they needed to 
and no additional testimony was reread to the jury. (Tr., p.451, Ls.3-14.) 
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Recognize That It 
Had Discretion To Determine What Testimony Would Be Reread To The 
Jwy 
The comments by the district court, that it was up the jury to determine what 
testimony was reread to them, illustrate a clear abuse of discretion. The district court 
clearly failed to correctly recognize that it had discretion to determine what specific 
testimony should be reread to the jury and failed, despite an objection, to analyze the 
potential prejudicial effect of reading only the section of the testimony requested by the 
jury. 
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2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading 
Of Only A Limited Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony, 
Over Defense Objection That Additional Portions Of The Testimony 
Should Also Be Reread 
Because only a limited portion of the confidential informant's testimony was 
reread, the jury was not provided important information that expanded upon or clarified 
the portion of the testimony reread to the jury, thereby misleading the jury. The reread 
portion of the testimony did not include the following highly important information: 
Mr. Martinez clarified that all he saw was Mr. Hurtado approach Mr. Garcia's SUV, 
noting that he was now sure that Jose approached the SUV, with his back turned 
towards Mr. Martinez and that he was only assuming that is when the transaction 
occurred. (Tr., p.254, L.22 - p.255, L.2.) Mr. Martinez noted that when Jose Hurtado 
approached Mr. Garcia's SUV he did not see anything change hands, specifically 
seeing no money or drugs (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-20) and that while Mr. Hurtado and 
Mr. Garcia were close enough to touch each other, Mr. Martinez did not see what their 
arms were doing. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-10.) It was a few minutes after the meeting at the 
SUV, probably three or four minutes, that Jose Hurtado handed the methamphetamine 
to Mr. Martinez. (Tr., p.255, Ls.11-18.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Martinez noted that while he was standing outside 
during the drug purchase, at least a couple of other men, some of whom he did not 
know, came and went. (Tr., p.267, L.18 - p.268, L.7.) During this same time, Jose 
Hurtado, who was wearing shorts with pockets, left saying he was going to the store 
about an hour after Mr. Martinez arrived; Mr. Martinez had no personal knowledge of 
where Mr. Hurtado went during that time. (Tr., p.268, L.15 - p.269, L.19.) Mr. Martinez 
also reiterated that he handed the buy money to Jose Hurtado, while Mr. Garcia was not 
present, that it 'vvas Jose Hurtado that handed him the methamphetamine, that he could 
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not see Mr. Hurtado or Mr. Garcia's hands while they were talking at the SUV, and that 
he never saw any methamphetamine in Mr. Garcia's SUV. (Tr., p.270, L.23 - p.271, 
L.13; p.274, L.19 - p.275, L.3.) 
The district court's failure to reread critical testimony resulted in prejudice to 
Mr. Garcia as it created a likelihood that the reread evidence was given undue weight, 
consideration, and emphasis by the jury or may have mislead the jury. 
Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Garcia only has the duty to prove that 
an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. Mr. Garcia 
asserts that the State will be unable to prove the error was harmless. 
3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading 
Of A Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony That Had Been 
Ruled Inadmissible And That The Jury Had Been Told To Disregard 
When the district court allowed the rereading of the limited portion of the 
confidential informant's testimony, it also allowed for testimony that was ruled 
inadmissible and that the jury had been told to disregard to be reread and 
reemphasized. Specifically, the following sections were reread to the jury: 
Q. Did you receive any meth at that time while Robert was there the 
first time? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And did you know why? 
A. Jose Hurtado told me that he would go get it from his house. 
Q. Do you know who he - who is "he"? 
A. Robert. 
MS. HICKS [defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. What Jose 
Hurtado says is complete hearsay. 
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THE COURT: I'll sustain it. 
THE COURT: So the jury is instructed to disregard the answer to that 
question of the statement as to what Jose told him. 
(Tr., p.240, Ls.9-23.) 
Q. All right. And do you remember why you gave [the buy money] to 
[Jose Hurtado] atthat time? 
A. I recall because he was going to give it to Robert Garcia for the 
meth. 
Q. Okay. 
MS. HICKS: Objection, Your Honor. That's not based on personal 
knowledge. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain an objection to the "he was going to give it to 
Robert." He's testifying to what someone else was going to do, so I'll 
sustain it, and you're instructed to disregard the statement as to what 
someone else was going to do. 
(Tr., p.244, L.22 - p.245, L.8.) 
Mr. Garcia recognizes that there was not a specific and timely objection to the 
rereading of the testimony that the jury was told to disregard. Mr. Garcia notes that this 
issue was presented to the district court when the Rule 29 motion was renewed. (Tr., 
p.462, Ls.21-25.) As such, he asserts that this issue is preserved for appeal. However, 
should this court disagree, Mr. Garcia asserts that the error in rereading the 
inadmissible testimony is reviewable under Perry, 150 Idaho 209. This error involves a 
violation of Mr. Garcia's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and 
impartial jury. It is clearly a violation of Mr. Garcia's constitutional rights to have a jury 
reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as 
explained in the jury instructions. He asserts that the reemphasis of inadmissible 
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evidence allowed the jury to rehear and potentially consider evidence that was not 
properly admitted at trial and clouded the jury's exclusive function to weigh the evidence 
presented. 
Further, the error is clear from the record. It could not have been a strategic 
decision of the part of defense counsel because counsel objected to the testimony 
being heard by the jury the first time and clearly no strategic benefit could befall the 
defendant by having it heard a second time. 
Finally, the error is not harmless because the district court recognized that the 
error may have contributed to the verdict. At the sentencing hearing, the district court 
recognized that the rereading of the inadmissible evidence may have affected the 
outcome of the case: 
Why I'm making any comment at all is Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's 
as well, that in order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury 
considered other evidence that was either unreliable from a legal 
perspective of that the jury was told to disregard .... What I have is 
concerns about is the conviction, is the - some of the things the jury might 
have considered in a very narrow, very close case. In many cases this 
would not matter, this type of thing wouldn't matter at all. In this case I'm 
afraid it might. 
(Tr., p.498, L.17 - p.501, L.21.) 
The rereading and reemphasizing of the inadmissible evidence resulted in 
prejudice to Mr. Garcia as it created a likelihood that the reread evidence would be 
given undue weight, consideration, and emphasis by the jury. 
D. This Court Must Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction And Remand The Case For A 
New Trial 
Mr. Garcia asserts it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to allow the 
limited rereading of a portion of the confidential informant's testimony including 
inadmissible evidence because the district court failed to recognize that it had discretion 
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to limit or expand on the portions of the testimony reread to the jury and because the 
reading of the limited portion of the testimony, including sections that had been 
previously ruled inadmissible, prejudiced Mr. Garcia. As such, his case must be 
remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and 
conviction because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. Alternatively. 
Mr. Garcia requests the matter be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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